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THE CIRCLE OF THE PROTECTED: ri'OWARD A
RE-ORGANIZATION OF ALLIANCE ;POLITICS 1

Andrew P. Dunne

A new volume has recently opened in the history of NATO, and perhaps in the
'

international system. On 28 February 1994 NATO fighter je~s shot down four Serbian
Jastreb light attack aircraft over Bosnia. The action, trivial i1;1 the annals of military history,
'

was unprecedented in terms of NATO's self-conceived mission. It was the first time the
organization used force, and it did so to defend interests that :could not be tied directly to a
member nation's defense. Coupled with the Partnership for Peace plan, approved in
January, NATO has unambiguously gone "out-of-area" .2
NATO's acquisition of new security functions raises many questions. Should the

membership expand? What should be the standards for new members to the organization?
!

Should there be different membership ranks with different rights and responsibilities? What
should be NATO's geographical scope? What should be NATO's relationship to other
international institutions? Should NATO become the world's policeman?

1

This research was made possible by support from the Lentz Peace Research Association,
the Center for International Studies, and the Department of i;>olitical Science at the University
of Missouri-St. Louis.
'
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For a position supporting the "out-of-area" policy see, Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L.
Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO" !Foreign Affairs 72
(September/October 1993), 28-40; for an opposing viewpoint see Owen Harris, "The
Collapse of the West" ibid., 41-53.

This paper proposes that alliance politics be re-organized to establish a confederated
democratic community (CDC) that is global in scope. The basic argument is that a CDC is
the most desirable of many conceivable macro-systems, and one that is suited to the-value
structure of today's leading international actors, particularly the United States and its G-7
colleagues. It would provide a framework of legitimacy that national units cannot achieve
unilaterally. Such legitimacy would be particulary useful in Germany, for example, and
would supplement recent high court decisions permitting an expanded international role for
that nation. The overall structure of the international system would radiate from a particular
center, The Circle of the Protected, which would include as members those political animals
that should be considered vital interests, namely, advanced democracies.
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section explains why it is important
that the United States have a well-focused global strategy, and one based on "freedom and
democracy". Then, five alternative international systems are presented for comparative
purposes. The structures that would give these systems identity and some of the most
important conditions for stability are stated. The third section explains why one of these
systems--the CDC--is desirable and realistic, and how this central system relates to different
classes of international actors. This section also examines the Partnership for Peace
program, distinguishes "partners" from "associate members" of NATO, and then
recommends that these distinctions be applied on a global scale. The final section of the
paper proposes norms, capabilities, and an alliance structure for the Confederated
Democratic Community. The problem with current debates about NATO's future is that the
scope of the proposals has been limited to "Europe.

II

Although it is legitimate to redefine NATO's mission, that problem must be placed in
a wider context than- Europe. NATO's new mission must be fitted to both the macrointernational system, and its domestic members political systems, systems which give policy
stability. Because of its great capabilities and global interests, no stable security system can
be constructed globally without the United States. Thus the U.S. domestic political system
forms the chief domestic parameter to which security planners must accommodate
themselves.

U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY

The United States has an enormous incapacity to act in situations which do not evoke
its historical sense of mission. The United States has always been a revolutionary power. In
the absence of a threat--an evil empire--the only mission which can inspire a coherent foreign
policy is "freedom and democracy." Although human rights and institution-building are
compatible with American values, and should be pursued when prudent, the United States
lacks the capacity to deal with every violation of human and political rights, and the public's
interest in tragic situations that are not tethered to the American sense of grand mission will
be fleeting. Had the situation in Bosnia been framed in terms of protecting a fraternal
"melting pot" and centered on a policy designed to strengthen democratic factions and
·institutions, rather than being hyped as a nationalistic traditional feud, there is a chance that a
meaningful policy might have been formulated at the outset of the conflict, and a chance that
European actors might have been more forthcoming.
Unless policy is focused through unifying symbols that are compatible with American
ideals, ambivalence will characterize the national mind-set. An ambivalent international
3

temperment is vulnerable. to sudden dislocations, and the direction of discharge is more likely
to be oriented by television images than by rational thought. The war in Bosnia has resulted
in an estimated 200,000 deaths, not to mention the other forms of barbarism which have
occured, but European and American policy was unable to reach even minimal consensus
j

until 54 Sarajevans were killed in a mortar hit on a local market.
In the absence of both a clear strategic mission and the presence of an unambiguous
threat, the situation is likely to be far worse. Drift can be expected, a process similar to that
occuring in the immediate aftermath of World War IL At that time policy was based on
vague reliance on -the United Nations.
Diplomatic and other non-military action represent the only means at the disposal of
the U.S. to check this extension of Soviet power until such extension involves the
seizure of regions in which the power of the Soviet armies can be countered
defensively by the Naval, amphibious, and air power of the U.S. and its potential
allies. The Charter of the United Nations affords the best and most unassailable
means through which the U.S. can implement its opposition to Soviet physical
expansion. 3
Operating within this mind-set the United States demobilized its troops with great disregard
for the stability of the international system. By the end of June 1947, the forces in Europe
were considered so weak that military plans called for their evacuation in the event of a
Soviet invasion, though it was hoped that a lodgement might be maintained either in Italy or
behind the Pyrenees. The situation was still bleaker in that a debate occurred between
General Eisenhower and Admiral Leahy. Eisenhower maintained that the troops could be
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Memo, Matthews to SWNCC, "Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use in
Connection with Military Studies," 1 Apr 1946, FROTUS, 1946, 1:1167-1171.
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evacuated successfully, Leahy argued that they would probably be,captured. 4 And despite
the Administration's commitment to anti-communist and anti-Soviet policies, prior to the
Korean War adequate resources were not allotted to this task. That it took the drama of war
to sharpen America's focus is instructive, for in that case there existed an image of an
expansionist enemy power which was perceived as a direct threat to vital interests.
The unwillingness to devote resources was based largely on fiscal considerations. So
instead of adding $2-3 billion to the defense budget to defend commitments, fiscal
conservatism helped precipitate the Korean War. Instead of, perhaps $17 b1llion dollars in
1950, defense appropriations were about $50 billion by 1953.
This example is not meant to suggest that the United States and its allies today have
insufficient military forces. The international macrosystem, the morale and capabilities of
potentially deviant actors, and the forces-in-being of the democratic actors bear no relation to
these earlier times. The situation today is far more fortunate. These favorable circumstances
are not, however, cause for unbridled enthusiasm. In the current international system the
manifestation of an unambiguous threat to the United States and the other democracies is not
likely, and this makes it all the more important to set a clear, long term policy for the
management of the international system. For, in the absence of such a threat to "survival,"
decision makers may fail to deal adequately with those threats which nonetheless exist, or
may overreact to situations that are not sustainable in the long-term (such as institutionbuilding in Somalia). And if those kinds of patterns coalesce, the specific structure of world
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Schnabel, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1:153, 156; Morton A. Kaplan, The Life
and Death of the Cold War: Selected Studies in Postwar Statecraft (Chicago: Nelson-Hall,
1976), 30.
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order may result as an ·unintended consequence of unrelated policies. Brief consideration of
some alternative macrosystems will provide a context for the policy objectives which will
follow.

SOME ALTERNATIVE MACROSYSTEMS

It is possible to conceive of at least five international systems with which the actions
of today's world leaders might or might not be compatible. These systems range from a
very unintegrated unit-veto system to a very integrated hierarchical system. 5

THE UNIT VETO SYSTEM

The unit veto system is a system in which nuclear weapons have proliferated into
large numbers of international actors. The large numbers of nuclear capable actors would
increase the information costs and dangers of monitoring international security. Because of
these factors, actors in such a system would be reluctant to integrate th~ir foreign and
defense functions, and thus they would tend towards self-reliance. European political
cooperation would be unlikely to move forward and could suffer a significant reversal.
Germany and Japan would probably acquire nuclear capabilities in such a system.
A unit veto system could emerge in the wake of further Russian decline or civil war.
As military cohesion disintegrated or was further penetrated by organized crime, sales of
military weapons and technologies might accelerate. There is evidence that these dangers are

5

This section has been influenced by Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in
International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957) and Towards Professionalism in International
Relations (New York: Free Press, 1979).
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quite real. 6 If North Korea and Iran received sufficient stocks, for example, Japan, Turkey,
and Kazakhstan would have to seriously consider their nuclear options. In the case of Iran,
the Middle East-Central Asian region would become highly unstable, and might lead to a
major buildup of nuclear capabilities. A general consensus exists that Pakistan, India, and
Israel already possess some kinds of nuclear weapons capabilities.
This type of system would be stable only under highly unlikely conditions. All the
actors would have to have secure second-strike forces (thus guaranteeing a retaliatory
capability) and they would have to have rational leadership and technologically competent
military personnel. These conditions seem implausible in today's world, and movement
toward this kind of system would greatly increase the dangers of nuclear war.

TRUNCATED BIPOLAR SYSTEM
A truncated bipolar system would exhibit some of the features that were present in the
Western-Warsaw system of the mid- to late twentieth century, except that the Western bloc
would in a comparative sense be even stronger and larger than it was in the previous system.
A Russian dominated bloc, possibly under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, might attempt to regulate what the Russians call the near-abroad. Under some
conditions--a human rights campaign?--China might be persuaded to cooperate or join the
bloc, as the dominant principle in both actor-systems would be to preserve authoritarian and
nationalistic systems of control. In either case there would be major tensions around the

6

See Seymour Hersh, The Atlantic Monthly, June 1994.
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entire periphery of Russia, especially in successor states with large Russian populations, such
as northern Kazakhstan.
Were it not for the vastly greater capabilities of the Western bloc, this system would
be extremely unstable. As it is, it would still be fairly unstable, because of the differences
between the former Soviet bloc and the nature of a possible Russian bloc. The Soviet Union
was conservative and totalitarian. Local and regional tensions were not tolerated. For that
kind of regulation to again arise, it would have to be imposed onto Russia's current
periphery. But strong revanchist tendencies such as these might find outlets in civil wars.
Many of the nascent states would then clamor for assistance from wherever they could obtain
it. As this might include purchases from disloyal Russian military units, the tendency toward
a unit veto system might become amplified. But even without this worst-case scenario
occuring, a series of brush-fire wars could break out across the Eurasian Heartland.

THE CONFEDERATED DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY (CDC)

A confederal democratic system would be an expanded and intensified outgrowth of
the Western bloc. On a global basis it would develop common rules and procedures for
membership, defense, peace-keeping, human rights, military assistance, sanctions, export:control policies, and recruitment. All actors that met these standards would be eligible to
join the confederation. These rules and procedures would be universal for members of the
community. This system would be led by the advanced democracies in the international
system, though the other democracies would have substantial decision-making roles. Because
of the substantial capabilities which this system would possess, it would be highly stable. It

8

is for this type of system that the paper proposes a re-organization of alliance politics. Thus,
this brief statement of the system's characteristics is at present sufficient.

THE UNIVERSAL SYSTEM

The universal system would be a system that is best represented by the most ideal
conceptions of the United Nations. It would constitute a "system under law". This system
would have a political subsystem, which for some functions--for example, violations of
international law or sanctions--will set the jurisdictional limits of its members (and possibly
all actors who are formally equivalent to its members, such as "all states" or "all nations").
Within its functional jurisdictions, the system would have a tendency to operate directly on
individual human beings. Examples would include war crime tribunals, or the execution of
relief operations.
At least two conditions are required for the universal system to maintain equilibrium.
The members must have complementary if not fully compatible value systems if they are to
internalize the rule~. of law which the universal system promulgates. This must be true for
the vast majority of members if not the entire membership. Otherwise member states will
not subordinate their actions to the jurisdiction of the universal actor. Second, the universal
system must possess greater capacity than its members, in the sense that the U.S. federal
government possesses greater capacity than the state governments.
Because of the diversity of value systems represented by the various states that today
comprise the international system, the functions which a universal system can adjudicate are
highly circumscribed. Moreover, the universal system is highly unlikely to develop
sufficient capacity to regulate its members, with the possible exception of the smallest
9

members. Any effort to promote a major expansion of universal functions at this time is
unlikely to succeed, and may in fact cause disintegrative tendencies in the international
community as deviant actors attempt to exploit the weakness of the universal actor by
attempting to divide its members.
These considerations do not imply that the United Nations is unimportant or irrelevant
in the current international system. It is an extremely useful forum for the exchange of
information and provides a measure of legitimacy for those international actions which it
approves. Unless vital interests are directly threatened there is no reason that the CDC
should not implement policies in accordance with the United Nations. But realistic executive
and security functions are not within the capacity of either the organization as a whole or the
Office of the Secretary General.

THE HIERARCHICAL INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The hierarchical system would be a world government. Such a system could be of
directive (authoritarian) or non-directive (democratic) form. It would require a very
powerful centralized political subsystem, and it would operate directly on human· beings.
Sovereign states as independent political systems, would probably disappear. The national
actor systems would tend to be territorial subdivisions of the hierarchical system. Under
conditions of modem mass communications this system could prove highly stable. However,
because of the same problems faced by the universal system with respect to values, this
system is at present highly unlikely to be successfully implemented by non-directive actors,
and the absence of a highly ca~able authoritarian actor renders the directive form of the
system even less likely.
10

THE CDC IN GLOBAL SECURITY
If the general objective of global security needs to be framed through the symbols of
freedom and democracy, specific objectives must be fitted to the particular shape of the
alternative macrosystem which is desired. It would seem that, if given a choice, few would
desire a unit veto or truncated bipolarity to emerge in the international system. And though
some would desire a universal or hierarchical system, the level of centralization necessary to
maintain the norms of those systems does not exist on a global basis.
If the argument thus far makes sense, then some system that resembles the
Democratic Confederal System is most desirable and most likely to be stable, though
universal and hierarchical features are likely to be present in, for example, the United
Nations, military command organs, and democratic decision-making units. But if this is true
then particular policies, including security policy, must be designed to optimize the long term
growth and stabilization of the democratic community.
Attempts to maximize narrowly conceived national interests--such as trade--are likely
to create divisions within the democratic community, especially by reducing the capacity to
control weapons proliferation. Such policies would amplify disintegrative tendencies. On
the other hand, attempts to maximize more universal rights would be exhaustive in a
political, financial, and decision-making sense. Neither orientation can be undertaken
without distracting decision-makers from the institutional and organizational commitments
necessary to stabilize global democratic security.
There exists a natural desire among good people to share their faith in communion
with others, but the promotion of democracy on the one hand, or free market interests on the

11

other, should not be maximized every place where these values are at present limited. True
enough: free-market democracies reduce costs, have a tendency to create strong middle
classes, do not starve to death, do not usually start wars (especially not with other
democracies), and create an environment that permits the creative capacities of humankind to
develop and spread, especially in science and culture. However, there must be conditions on
the ground that permit democracy to flourish. Those conditions include the presence of a
relatively educated, and substantial middle class. In places such as Somalia and Haiti, those
conditions do not yet exist.
Although in human terms it will often be tragic, the United States and the Democratic
Community cannot incorporate everyone within the category of vital interests. For vital
interests are only vital when a decision is reasonably stable about what is worth living and
dying for. In mass democratic societies such stability depends on at least broad support.
And those interests which are vital and which can achieve broad support belong inside what
might be called the Circle of the Protected (COP). But the COP will be embedded in a
wider macro-system, and distinctions must be made if the democratic community is to
optimize its values.

THE CDC IN TRI-FOCUS
Unifying symbols alone cannot substitute for grand strategy. No strategy is possible
without an appropriate institutional and organizational framework. Therefore, the United
States and its allies must decide who are included, who are near, and who are far from The
Circle. Only this decision will permit the integration of the diverse ideas and role functions
which are being bandied about as candidate foreign policy prescriptions.
12

Stable, free societies include less than 20 percent of world population. However,
their share of gross world product exceeds 60 percent. 7 If reasonable organizational
solutions can be found to overcome collective action problems, then maintenance of an
international system that does not threaten the values of these societies is far more likely to
result from coordinated policies than from random efforts on the part of individual
governments. This objective, however, is far easier to pronounce than it is to accomplish.
Some writers committed to a more democratic world order seem more optimistic than
the evidence warrants. 8 Although the potentiality exists that Democracy is poised for "final"
historical success, the situation will not be actualized without a policy rudder. Individual and
group interests throughout the advanced democracies are and will continue to promote
diverse agendas for global security--about the United Nations, NATO, the European
Community, the Western European Union, democracy, and human rights, to mention a small
sample. If strategy is the relationship among values, instrum'ents, and objectives, then these
ideas must be strategically integrated, or the democracies will find themselves adrift in a
complex and turbulent system. During the bipolar system, dangers tended to be clear and
present, whereas in the current system dangers are at most foggy and imminent.

It will take a strong beacon to pierce such haze. That beacon must illuminate the
contents and relationships of the three foci of democratic world order.

7

Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order (Chatham, NJ: Chatham
House Publishers, 1993); Directorate of Intelligence, Handbook of International Economic
Statistics, 1992 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).
8

Singer and Wildavsky, The Real World Order; Francis Fukuyama, "The End of
History?" in The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989).
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SCOPE OF MEMBERSHIPS

The Near and Far

Although the details will have to be worked out as a strategy develops, the central
circle and those furthest from it are easiest to specify. At the center of the Circle of the
Protected are the world's leading advanced democracies (G-7) and their fellow advanced
democracies. "Advanced democracies" would generally comprise a class of actors whose
political systems are stable democracies and economically advanced. In addition to the G-7,
advanced democracies might include, for example, most of the other members of Western
Europe as well as Australia, Israel, and possibly New Zealand. Historical precedents would
almost certainly require that this circle include all NATO members even though some of
these--Turkey, Greece, Portugal--are at present underdeveloped in terms of either economic
advancement or the depth of democracy.

Those farthest from the circle are states led by

dictatorial, demagogic regimes (e:g., North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Cuba).
Where to place the rest of the world will entail making choices today for the world
order of tomorrow. But policy must start with today. The future governments of Eastern
and Southeastern Europe, as well as countries as diverse· as Russia and South Africa must be
considered as potential members of the circle. But in some cases, such as Russia, it seems
that the potentiality is a long way from actuality.

The Near-To-Us

The problem in classifying the near-to-us is that the values motivating choices are
complex. The motive for "peaceful relations" is desirable regardless of the nature of the

14

state in question, but the desirability of expanding security institutions and guarantees is
filtered through a values matrix that determines "political identity."
The American idea of making some states "partners" rather than "members" of
NATO offers a partial solution to this problem, but at present the policy does not seem
motivated by clarity of political vision.
The Partnership for Peace invites Europe's new democracies to take part right away
in military and political cooperation with NATO members as well as with each other.
Those states that join the partnership can participate in military planning, exercises,
and operations. The Partnership will help foster democratic practices that can prepare
these states for full NATO membership. 9
The main problem with this program is in its arbitrary scope of membership. In the
Vice President's statement, the use of the term "new" can only be meaningfully attached to
"democracies" if it is interpreted to mean "potential". Otherwise the last sentence cited
would have been unnecessary. To be sure, the first country that signed up was Romania,
which recently erected a statue of General Ion Antonescu, the Fascist dictator from World
War IL Some estimates claim that Antonescu presided over the deaths 250,000 Jews and
20,000 Gypsies. The ceremony was held on 22 October 1993, one day after Congress
granted Romania most-favored-nation status, and was attended by some government
officials. 10 The situation in other II partners" is equally muddy.
In Ukraine, the inflation rate is estimated at 90-100 percent per month. It has been
extremely difficult to eliminate Ukraine's 176 long-range nuclear missiles. On 30 January
1994 the Crimea, part of Ukraine since Khrushchev made a gift of it in 1954, but with a

9

Al Gore, "Forging a Partnership for Peace and Prosperity" Dispatch, 5/2 (10 Jan 1994).
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Andrei Codrescu, New York Times, 7 December 1993.
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majority Russian population, chose a regional President who favors seceding and joining
Russia.

If these cases are not sufficiently elastic applications of the term "new democracies"
then consider the announcement by Franjo Tudjman, Croatia's President, that in exchange
for signing the Washington accords on Croatian-Bosnian federation, he had been explicitly
promised membership in the partnership program. There are, however, strong nationalistic
and possibly racist elements in the government coalition. 11
Although the rhetoric has been somewhat ambiguous, the Partnership program is not a
defensive arrangement. Reports on the program indicate that NATO will pledge to open
immediate consultations with any country in the partnership that felt its security was
threatened. It will develop capabilities to meet contingencies such as crisis management,
humanitarian missions, and peacekeeping. The program has also been designed as an
institution-building mechanism, whereby joint planning, training and military exercises are
expected to develop useful habits of cooperation and common military standards and
procedures. Partners will be permitted permanent representatives at NATO military and
political organizations and at military operations headquarters at Mons. 12

In fact the partnership program is a combination: desire to expand the scope of the
democratic circle further East, and political salve to assuage Russian sensibilities. It may not
have the desired effect, especially if it is applied without discrimination. If some of the

11

New York Times, 5 March and 28 May 1994.
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New York Times, 3 December 1993; Warren Christopher, "Promoting Security and
Stability in Europe" Dispatch, 5/2, (10 Jan 1994).
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Central and East European states are worthy of integration in democratic community
apparatuses, then they should be incorporated. If they are not, then it is very unclear what

all the talk is about. Will Ukraine be more or less secure as a "partner"? Given a variety of
circumstances Ukraine could come under amplified pressure from Russia. If that pressure
becomes severe, what will Ukraine's partners do? Go to war?
The rationale for the partnership policy is not sufficiently developed. Although it is
true that incorporating former communist regimes into NATO would disturb Russia, they
should not necessarily become members even if that were not the case. Nor should they
necessarily be excluded because it is the case. Russia is a consideration but it is not the only
one. Most of these countries cannot yet be considered sufficiently developed along the
democratic path to warrant inclusion inside the Circle. Nor can Russia. What is essential is
to establish standards for these countries--especially Russia--to re-organize and orient
themselves to a world organized to protect democratic values. Countries that successfully reorganize should be incorporated, Russia notwithstanding, though efforts to assuage Russian
sensitivities should be continued when necessary.
Russia is not presently a global military power. It has disintegrated. Its demographic
trends are becoming those of an underdeveloped country. Its nuclear and military might are
thoroughly unusable in all but local arenas. The greatest threats arising from Russia's
collapse relate to the sale of arms--nuclear and otherwise--to the highest bidders. 13 This
threat is closely followed by the danger of civil war, which could lead to enormous refugee
problems.

13

Seymour Hersh, The Atlantic Monthly, June 1994.
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If Russia survives as a political unit in its present form, it will

take fifteen to twenty

years just to build a path out of Russia's economic problems. The situation is much worse
than that faced by the United States in Europe and Japan at the end of World War II. In that
situation the United States had fifty percent of gross world product, had a ·population that
was accustomed to sacrifice, had very strong social traditions to work with inside the target
countries, and was an occupying authority in Germany and Japan capable of strongly
regulating the genesis of political processes. Unless U.S. policy is very well-coordinated
with the other advanced democratic states, there is little chance that inputs into the Russian
system will be sufficiently focused to have a positive effect.

Distinctions Among the Near-To-Us
The primary problem with the partnership program is its failure to adequately
distinguish legitimate alliance preferences. It is extremely difficult to comprehend how
Croatia, Ukraine, and Romania can be treated as the political equals of Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary. What is needed is a distinction between "Associate Members" and
"Partners". Associate Members would be that class of states that are very close to the
membership requirements of the advanced democratic states. Partners would be states that
are committed to a peaceful international system, and who can be expected to resolve
confli~ts in coordination with The Circle of the Protected.

It is likely that some east European states should become "partners" at this time,
others should be excluded, and some should even be incorporated inside The Circle as
Associate Members. In some cases choices may be difficult. But regardless of the particular
choices which are made at the boundary of the Circle, the mission of U.S. and allied global
18

strategy will be clear: to view members and associate members of the circle as a vital
interest; to foster development of partners so that they can eventually become incorporated;
to offer substantial aid and assistance if these partners are threatened by non-democratic
elements; and to assume some costs and make some efforts to aid and encourage democratic
elements in the pariah states.

GOINGGWBAL
An additional problem with the partnership program is that it is restricted to former
communist regimes. In light of the framework established above, this restriction is
unnecessary. The three foci of the Circle--Democracies, Partners, and deviants--provide a
common frame of reference for political identity on a global basis. It is a framework that
permits the regulated expansion of The Circle to occur in tandem with social and political
transformations that occur in particular national actor systems. And in light of this global
framework, the expansion of The Circle to include Associate Members can proceed post
haste.
Associate Members can first be recruited from the same pool delineated by the
partnership program. The fledgling democracies of Central Europe have borne the chief
weight of the postwar settlement at Yalta, a decision reached in an operationally more
complex environment that does not exist today. It is strongly in our interest to welcome
them when they meet conditions for civilian control of the military, are willing to integrate
some of their defense policies, when it is clear that the rule of law is stable, and when their
economies have settled down. Although the probabilities are low that Russia will attempt to
move Westward, the costs under such a scenario are extremely high. And the nature of our
19

democratic political systems are not conducive to making rational decisions under such dark
conditions. Policy must be formulated during peace, when the possibility of paying the costs
are distant and unlikely. Moreover, a real expansion eastward--rather than a paper one--will
reduce the probability of Russian intervention still further. Expanding the Circle of the
Protected is an element "in a long term insurance policy.
The Circle should not, however, be limited to Europe. Threats to the advanced
democracies are global. There is very little today that can both be called a threat and
something regional or national. A refugee problem emitting from the Balkans affects the
political and economic stability of Germany and this affects the world economy . 14 A threat
to raw material supplies affects the entire advanced world. An embargo disproportionately
affects the target country's main trading partners, and this affects the latter's ability to
purchase goods and services, and may affect political stability. (This last example suggests
the need for a burden-sharing capability--a Bank for International Political Emergencies--to
be put in place to subsidize those who take a disproportionate hit during an embargo).
The importance of incorporating the advanced democracies behind common principles
of international action cannot be underestimated. If clear signals are to be sent to developing
political entities, then those signals must be sent through common transmitters. Otherwise

14

Current reports indicate that approximately 1.5 million refugees and asylum seekers are
in Germany. See Craig R. Whitney, "Germany Relents on Expulsion of 100,000 Croatian
Refugees" New York Times, 11 February 1994. If these figures are adjusted for differences
in population, this would be equivalent to the arrival of approximatley 4.5 million refugees in
the United States. However, if adjusted for territory, it would be equivalent to the same 4.5
million refugees arriving in an area slightly smaller than the State of California.
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foreign policies may work at cross-purposes, and issues will be treated on an ad hoc basis.
In this respect, consider the Middle East peace process.

The CDC and the Middle East
An important component of political stability is political relations. For example, the
peace process in the Middle East is not stable. Palestinian expectations will rise as the
negotiations proceed during the next five years. If the Palestinian entity were a stable
democracy this might pose no dangerous problems, but in the rush to "aid the peace process"
the importance of democratic political stability is getting lost, if indeed it ever existed. The
Democratic Community should be coordinating international aid and assistance from the
perspective of promoting democracy. Too often American foreign policy is structured by
economic and military considerations that are promoted as somehow more real than political
ones. This approach seems fundamentally misguided. The Democratic Community does not
need to prop up a non-democratic regime--such as Arafat's--in the Middle East. An
economically viable Palestinian entity that is subject to rapid seizure by extremists is not a
rational policy.
U.S. decision-makers have at times demonstrated some predisposition to engage in
institution-building. This predisposition should be applied to Palestinian governance, though
the effort should not be undertaken unless the United States plans to stick to it.
Another useful support for stabilizing the Middle East peace process is for the
Democratic Community to extend more direct security guarantees to democratic Israel. The
Rabin government has moved boldly. If for some reason--and there are many--the effort
fails, widespread unrest could set the peace process back by decades as the tide of Israeli
21

public opinion turns glum. A firm committment to stand with democracy in the Middle :East
will enhance deterrence, and will increase the security level of Israeli citizens.
The peace process has made great strides in recent years, and all signs indicate that
this will continue. International policies, however, cannot be based on short-term estimates.
The situation in the Middle East cannot be projected into the future with great confidence. It
is not known, for example, what will occur in Jordan after King Hussein departs the scene.
Although Israel can effectively defend itself, this is not a completely good thing. For
it increases the need for Israel to strike quickly and unilaterally. Because of its extremely
small size, lengthy borders, and the presence of hostile states on these borders, Israel's
security is based on an offensive strategy. 15 As the peace process progresses there will be
increasing efforts to cut U.S. foreign assistance. This will suggest opportunities to some
Arab extremists and increase Israeli tendencies to strike quickly. Moreover, it will also
require Israel to seek stronger ties with any state willing to buy its military technology.
Even in the absence of a squeeze, Rabin's margin is razor thin and the government
cannot be expected to continue making bold moves if the security level of the average Israeli
citizen is not bolstered. Democratic Community security guarantees in exchange for uniting
Israel behind some common policies would enhance the peace process by tethering Israel into
a wider political framework, and deter potential extremists on both sides. If appropriate
conditions are met, Israel could be granted Associate Membership in The Circle. Even
though Israel would remain primarily responsible for its own defense, it may feel its time-

15

See John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983).
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horizons were somewhat expanded if it received backup guarantees from The Circle.
Moreover, Circle members could help to organize peacekeeping activities, which to Israel
would be a more acceptable form than one based on the United Nations.

Circle members

would also constitute a wide enough group from which Palestinians could draw advisors.
Bringing extra-European countries into an interlocking system of alliances in the
bipolar international system would have been a destabilizing factor, because it would have
imposed high political and psychological costs on many members to defend interests towards
which they were not equally committed. The Soviet Union could have easily exploited such
a situation to gain psychological and political victories. Incorporating Israel, for example,
would have driven most of the Arab world. into much closer bonds with the Soviet Union.
Absent such a threat, the integration of other democracies inside The Circle will tend to
create a bandwagon effect. This will require them to move toward democratic procedures,
but it will do so without excessive moralizing and threats of economic brinkmanship.
If non-democratic actors--such as Arafat--wish to rely on Russia to legitimize their

international position, the CDC should not interfere. These actors can then depend on Russia
for their economic development.

Other Potential Associates

Other potential associates might include South Africa, New Zealand, Taiwan, the
Philippines, much of South and Central America, Namibia, Botswana, and Mali.
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NORMS, CAPABILITIES, and ALLIANCE STRUCTURE
NORMS

Although it should be possible to unite the democracies behind common doctrinal
principles of world order, applying these principles to concrete situations will be very
difficult if the institutional rules and procedures of the community are rigid. With respect to
any particular issue or threat it would be unrealistic to expect wide-spread consensus from
anything resembling a community as diverse and geographically expansive as the one being
suggested. Although the Democratic Community can formally exist on the basis of universal
ideals for all its members, its stability will depend on the maintenance of functionally specific
. rules and procedures.
Norm differentiation results from the fact that different classes of actors can be
expected to play different roles in the international system. For the CDC to remain stable,
members of The Circle must not be divided on military affairs, that is, they must not assist
and arm different factions or different national actors ih the event of conflict. Moreover, in
the implementation of global security policy the national actors must subordinate their
interests to the interests of the community. This rule will be especially useful in dampening
weapons proliferation and terrorist activities.
The importance of solidarity among the members of the Circle implies that the
threshold for Associate Membership must be high. National actors designated as Associated
Democracies must be stable democracies, and be very likely to achieve the designation
"advanced democratic" in a reasonable period of time. This is necessary because it is likely
to prove very difficult to expel a national actor after it is admitted to associate status, and a
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high standard for admittance is reasonable in light of the substantial, if not full, security
guarantees that designation as an Associate would entail.
Associate Members must follow all CDC norms that apply to non-Circle actors, but
their obligations to the CDC would be less demanding than that expected of advanced
democracies.
It would be folly for the CDC to adopt a zealous outlook. There is no reason that the
CDC cannot survive in a system that includes non-democratic actors. The CDC should
cooperate with actors outside the circle so long as those actors do not violate democratic
principles in the extreme. Thus, Partners must remain committed to minimal standards of
international conduct. They must renounce the use of force to achieve non-defensive political
objectives, and must be committed to some minimal human rights. The governments must
be reasonably stable in order that such commitments are credible. 16
In addition to Partners, there may be other actors who do not meet all of these
standards, but nonetheless are not deviant with respect to the international system. China
may represent such an actor, as might an authoritarian Russia. These actors may be
classified as Undesignated Actors, and international intercourse may proceed but not on the
most favorable terms, which must be reserved primarily for the democratic community, and
secondly for its partners. Security considerations in these cases would proceed on a case-bycase basis ..

16

The CDC should not, however, commit the Athenian mistake of becoming either
expansive or attempting to impose.rules by imperial right. Members must not be
incorporated by force, and Partners, Associates, and Members must be permitted to
withdraw.
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Actors which are dangerous and violate basic standards of justice for either the
international system or their own national systems may be classified as Anti-democratic
states. These actors must be carefully monitored and regulated.

CAPABILITIES

Capabilities are the instrumental elements in the international system, and instruments
must be suited to the objectives they are designed to achieve. In social relations, instruments
are forged in organizations. Although the CDC will require more than military organization,
the analysis of non-military organization is beyond the scope of this paper. 17 With respect
to the use of force, there are at least five missions requiring specialized capabilities. These
are specified herewith. Then the alliance structure of the CDC is treated in the following
section.
The first mission is to provide for defense from external attack. This mission must be
designed for CDC members and associates, though this capability is unlikely to be be used.
No actor who makes calculations on the basis of the international system would attack a
CDC member if a clear policy was in place. Combined CDC capabilities would be daunting.
In NATO there exists ample experience with this type of capability, and the extension of
plans to other democracies should pose no major difficulty. With respect to associate
members, capabilities that amplify their ability for self-defense will, in general, probably be
sufficient, though the use of force to defend these actors cannot be ruled out. Whether such

17

A Bank for International Political Emergencies has been mentioned. In addition there
should be a Concert of Leading Democratic Actors, a Council of Ministers with a
Secretariat, and institutions for the monitoring of democracy and human rights. The CSCE
could probably assume some of these monitoring functions.
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a mission is desirable or not, in an advanced telecommunications age the possibility that it
will happen is always present, and thus capabilities fitted to the need should be present in
order to guard against drift or overzealousness.
In addition to direct defense of the Circle, the CDC must have a capability to protect
global vital interests. The protection of raw material supplies and stable air and sea lines of
communication are thus a second mission. If the need arises the CDC must have the
capabilities to roll-back any threats to these interests.
The CDC must also address three other security missions: terrorism, weapons
proliferation, and peacekeeping. In terms of the probability of threat, rather than intensity of
threat, these missions are the main problems facing the CDC, and the most likely to result in
festering collective action problems. In this context NATO's history provides a useful lesson
on the importance of democratic solidarity. After all, NATO was reasonably successful in
1

denying the Soviet Union advanced technical equipment. An integrated global organization
led by the United States has a far better chance of resolving collective action problems than
can be accomplished on bilateral or ad hoc multilateral bases.
Operational capabilities are necessary to support these missions. The CDC should
develop Shared Intelligence Networks (SIN), Quick Transfer (QT) capabilities, embargo and
interception units (EIU), and a diversified training program. SIN and QT capabilities could
be used to help Associated Democracies or Partners who are threatened by external actors.
SIN could be used to provide military information during crises and conflicts. QT should be
formulated to move materiel into the hands of associates and partners.
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EIUs could be used to regulate problems arising with respect to proliferation or
sanctions. These units would, of course, share both police-like and military functions. EIUs
must be capable of moving into location rapidly, and thus must be regionally and functionally
specific to the types of problems they are des1gned to address.
Peacekeeping operations are increasingly including military units on a world-wide
basis. This poses dangers of command, control, and coordination. In fact, this has been
cited as one of the reasons that the 18 Marines were killed in a firefight in Somalia. Because
CDC security functions will be led primarily by NATO countries, units earmarked for
peacekeeping, and units from Associated Democracies should undergo training in CDC rules
and procedures. Those actors earmarked for QT or SIN must have the ability to use those
capabilities in the event of a crisis. Other than NATO, no institution has the training,
structure, or experience to integrate these diverse military systems into coordinated role
functions and procedures.

ALLIANCE STRUCTURE
In a world in which dangers are diversified, military options must be more flexible
than would be appropriate for a bipolar system but more structured than would be true of a
unit-veto or 19th century balance of power system. The problems that can be expected to
arise in the international system are unlikely to directly threaten the survival of CDC
members. But if left unattended, or attended to on unilateral bases, such problems could
cause major dysfunctions in the normal life of these societies. Because of different interests,
perceptions, and stability among the particular members of the CDC, actors are unlikely to
simultaneously share an urgency to act in a given situation. There are certain to be regional
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I

and national differences from problem to problem. These difficulties suggest three elements
in the new alliance structure.
'

First, it would be useful to substitute an alternative to the decision-procedure that has
'

been common in NATO. Second, NATO should remain a "European" organization, but,
coupled wi~h its new decision-procedure, it should serve as a model for other regional
'

commands.: These regional commands will have operational control over most of the new
i

capabilities: discussed in the previous section. Third, these various commands should be
subsumed '3/ithin the CDC, who should appoint a Supreme Allied Commander of the
I

Democracies (SACDEM).
The;CDC should develop a far more flexible decision-procedure than NATO had
:

during the cold war. This flexibility is necessary because the mission of anti-WTO defense
I

is analyticajly simpler than the mission of democratic stabilization and long-term growth.
With respe~t to some types of decision, the structure of decision-makin~I should be adapted to
i

the new problems faced by the CDC. The unanimity rule in particular should be changed.
I

NATO was built to meet a particular problem. Faced with the presence of a
supranational actor with a supranational party apparatus, the unanimity rule made a great
1

deal of sen~e. It served to diminish the number occasions where actions would be taken that
would divide the alliance. In that system, a divided alliance was an opportunity for
i

exploitatiol}, That system does not exist today. 18 The unanimity rule is a rule for inaction
;
18

0ther practices from the past are presently being used in the formulation of policy.
Although dther considerations may suggest the wisdom of the approach, nothing in the
structure of the international system suggests that the embargo of Haiti should be called
anything but what it is--an embargo. The reason for calling "war-like" actions "police
actions" arid so forth during the bipolar system was to avoid formally provoking the Soviet
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I

in a complicated world, because the ability to obtain unanimous support for policies which
are not equ~ly felt among the member countries· is unlikely to be present in most cases.
Instead the CDC should adopt rules governing Flexible Command Coordination
I

:

(FCC). FGC could permit action committees to be formed among the leading members of a
regional CJ?C subsystem, committees that could act to solve a particular problem when it

I
arose, within the parameters of the defined missions of the organization. A minimum
number of members, say three, could submit a proposal for action and use of joint CDC
facilities. The proposal would go forward unless the committee's actions were overridden by
a "significant" group of members. The precise voting procedure would have to be specified
by the members. A "blocking majority" however, should be no smaller than three or four
actors and no larger than a majority. This range would prevent the organization from either
being seized or held hostage by a small minority. Other voting schemes could be
considered, perhaps those resembling the weighted voting procedure of the European Union.
Relaxing the unanimity rule in such a fashion would, for example,- permit- the CDC to
act in situations where particular actors lack the political will to act, or where a group of
actors wants to act but cannot get all their allies to go along (perhaps because of domestic
political obstacles). In this way the CDC could act globally even if all members did not feel
strongly about the problem. If there were members who were strongly opposed, they should
be capable of garnering a blocking majority if their reasons were at all persuasive.
In addition to NATO, organizations should be established for the Middle East/Persian
Gulf region and the Western Pacific. In the Middle East the leading members of the CDC

Union into defending its allies.
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might eventually include the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Israel, and
Turkey. In the Pacific, leading members might eventually include the United States, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan. These examples are illustrative only.
Organizations should also be considered for Southern Africa (especially if South Africa
stabilizes its democracy) and Southern South America.
A Supreme Allied Commander of the Democratic Community (SACDEM) should be
appointed, and all regional commands should be subsumed under SACDEM with respect to
the use of force. This position should be filled by a U.S. commander. SACDEM should be
charged with integrating commands and national units earmarked for CDC service into
common rules and procedures to accomplish CDC missions. In the event of major CDC
military operations, SACDEM should have command over the regional commanders.
SACDEM should also coordinate the recruitment of non-regional members for participation
in the region.

U.S. LEADERSHIP

The United States must take the lead in global strategy and institution building. An
optimal strategy for the long-term is to first integrate the Democratic Community, provide it
with rules and procedures for membership, defense, peacekeeping, human rights, military
assistance, sanctions, export-control policies, and recruitment. An administration that
accomplishes these objectives will certainly be remembered as one present at the creation of
a new international system. Others will be mentioned in foreign policy circles with the
frequency and deference accorded to the administration of Millard Fillmore (who?).
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